Threat Modeling : K8s Cluster

Navigating the Nebula of Risks



\$whoami

Shubhendu Shubham

"sudo rm -rf / problems"



CTF BADGES



















CERTIFICATIONS









(USTC

CASE 5

AMDE

Disclaimer !

If your systems can be compromised by published CVEs and a copy of Kali Linux, a threat model This Talk will not help you!



As always, you should ignore the **#CVSS** scores in Kubernetes until you understand how it affects your cluster.

Mark Manning @antitree· May 8

CVE-2020-8555: Half-Blind SSRF in kube-controllermanager:

"issue ... in Kubernetes where an authorized user may be able to access private networks on the Kubernetes control plane components"

groups.google.com/d/msg/kubernet...

3:19 PM · May 8, 2021 · Twitter for Android

Threat Model





Framework for rationalising security & Risk

Threat Actors

Beyond the Definitions



Taxonomy of Threat Actors

Actor	Motivation	Capability
Vandal : Script Kiddie,Trespasser	Curiosity, Personal Fame	Low level targeting Tool based Nmap., Metasploit, CVE PoCs
Motivated : Individuals, Political Activist, Thief	Personal, Political or ideological gain	Concealing attack , Minimal concern
Insider : Employees, External contractor, temporary worker	Discontent, Profit, Personal gain	Detailed Knowledge of internal system
Organised Crime: state affiliated groups, syndicates	Ransom , PII/PCI data mass extraction	Bribe/Coerce Targeted loss

Your First Threat Model

- Define Scope aka Target
- Gather much information
- Set trust boundaries
- Involve many stakeholders e.g:- Development, Operations, QA, Product, Business, Security

Tip:-

1st vs of Threat Model should be built without outside influence to allow fluid discussion & organic ideal generation

Example K8s attack vectors (Aqua)



Defensive Map : K8s Data flow diagram



Attack Trees

Let's design an attack tree which focuses on denial of service (DoS), which prevents ("denies") access to the system("service").

Approach : Bottom Up

Attacker's Goal : Top of diagram

Logic : "OR" and "AND " nodes



Components to Design Attack Tree



Commonly used Threat Modeling Techniques & Attack Data

- **STRIDE** (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation,Info Disclosure, DoS, Elevation of Privilege)
- Microsoft Kubernetes Threat Matrix
- MITRE ATT&CK Matrix for Containers
- OWASP Docker Top 10
- CNCF Financial Services User Group Threat Model

References

- 1. <u>https://github.com/cncf/financial-user-grouReference</u> p/tree/main/projects/k8s-threat-model
- 2. Hacking Kubernetes_ Threat-Driven Analysis and Defense by Andrew Martin

What's Next?

Meet me on 1st June 2024 at MS Office Bellandur



